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Architectures and Technologies for Adaptation 
of Secured Content in Governed Multimedia 
Applications 
 
Abstract— The wide range of media and consumer devices, currently available, has raised 
new security requirements for multimedia systems and their applications. Despite the wide 
variety of work conducted on the access control, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and 
adaptation areas to date, there is a lack of initiatives addressing them together. This article 
analyzes existing initiatives and proposes new technologies for the governed adaptations of 
secured content in heterogeneous environments. These technologies are integrated in an 
architecture for the secure management of multimedia contents, which covers the complete 
digital content value chain, from creation to consumption by end users. Video Surveillance 
is the application scenario chosen for further illustrating the use of the proposed 
architecture. Two use cases are discussed in order to address governance, protection and 
adaptation requirements in surveillance applications. 
 
Index Terms—Protected content adaptation, digital rights management systems, access 
control, video surveillance 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ultimedia applications managing protected content in heterogeneous 
environments have increased considerably in recent years. Nowadays, 
consumers and multimedia system users wish to access any kind of content 
from any device they have available. However, in most cases, resources are 
not available to all the users of a system, which in turn has to control user access and resource 
usage and management. On the other hand, if authorized users consume contents in 
heterogeneous usage environments, the contents need to be adapted for enhancing the users’ 
perceived quality. Therefore, platforms managing digital contents have to provide functionalities 
for users’ authentication, content protection and governance, data integrity and authenticity, 
content adaptation, content consumption and notification of events in an integrated fashion. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in 
the adaptation of secured content in governed multimedia applications. Section III proposes an 
architecture, which covers a complete Digital Rights Management (DRM) system, presenting an 
innovative approach for the adaptation of secured content. Section IV presents a specific 
application scenario, namely Video Surveillance, which poses a challenge for addressing users’ 
privacy protection, secure content access, data integrity and authenticity, users’ authentication, 
efficient transmission of video data and communication applications in heterogeneous usage 
 M 
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environments. Section V presents the necessary interfaces between the security modules of the 
architecture, focusing on the Video Surveillance scenario, and the content adaptation results. 
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and points out future research lines in the area of privacy 
protection. 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN ADAPTATION OF SECURED CONTENT IN GOVERNED MULTIMEDIA 
APPLICATIONS 
Current DRM initiatives specify how digital assets can be managed in a controlled way 
throughout the complete digital value chain. Among the different content life cycle stages, these 
initiatives focus on content distribution and consumption. The existing DRM systems enable the 
distribution and consumption of protected digital assets according to the terms stated by their 
distributors and rights holders [1]. Digital assets are governed by means of licenses expressed 
according to a Rights Expression Language (REL), while licenses containing rights and 
obligations are in turn enforced by license based authorization tools. Despite the significant 
research work conducted on content adaptation to date [2], not many of the current DRM 
initiatives consider the secure adaptation of digital assets as one of their requirements. A few of 
those initiatives enable the adaptation of protected content, but not the necessary fine-grained 
governance of digital assets. By definition, governance embodies the enforcement of rights 
expressions, which restrict content adaptations according to the terms stated by content creators 
and rights holders. 
A. Adaptation authorization 
As the development of the two aforementioned areas of research has been pursued separately, 
it seems impossible to govern content adaptations due to their lack of fine-grained descriptions 
about permissible conversions nowadays. Only very recently the two groups of researchers 
working on adaptation and DRM started to cooperate in jointly defining approaches and 
methodologies to combine each other’s outcomes into a single framework [3].  
While MPEG-21 Digital Item Adaptation (DIA) provides, among other features, the 
description of fine-grained media conversions by means of the conversion operations’ names and 
parameters, which can be used to define rights expressions to govern adaptation in an 
interoperable way; MPEG-21 REL data model for a rights expression includes four basic entities, 
principal, right, resource and condition. In order to follow this model, the MPEG-21 DIA 
conversion permissions have to be integrated within the Condition element. 
Many of the research projects that have been working with MPEG-21 DIA (e.g., DAIDALOS, 
aceMEDIA, etc) have earmarked this point as possible future work. We have been involved in 
other projects like AXMEDIS, VISNET II NoE, and the second part of Projecte Integrat, named 
project Machine, which have also begun to conduct research work in this area. Thus, to the best 
of our knowledge, we have developed the first real implementation of this new adaptation 
authorization concept [4]. 
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B. Content protection for adaptation 
Context-aware content adaptation is one of the powerful tools to enhance the perceived quality 
of the multimedia contents consumed in heterogeneous usage environments. To perform content 
adaptation operations, certain information embedded in the compressed bit streams has to be 
available to intermediate nodes of a delivery chain. However, classic video encryption 
technologies presume no third-party access to any information in the encoded video is necessary. 
Consequently, intermediate nodes have to decrypt the content before performing any adaptation 
operation. Decrypting at an intermediate node, however, is not allowed in an end-to-end content 
protection environment. A number of researchers have attempted to address this issue [5],[6].  
Our work, as most of the recent literature, focuses on encrypting H.264/Advanced Video 
Coding (H.264/AVC) and scalability extension of H.264/AVC (H.264/SVC) compatible bit 
streams. H.264 organises encoded data into Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) units, each of 
which is encapsulated into a data packet, and they are independently decodable. This feature 
improves the ability of adapting the encoded video data in a network friendly way. Hence, most 
of the encryption schemes proposed for H.264 independently treat each NAL unit. A number of 
H.264/AVC compatible partial ciphering techniques have been proposed by various researchers 
[7]-[9]. These techniques encrypt a set of selected syntax elements without disturbing the 
integrity of the bit stream. As a result, the bit stream can be parsed and subsequently decoded 
without decrypting the encrypted syntax elements even though the visual quality of the decoded 
video is greatly compromised. Hence, this type of encryption is suitable when the total 
confidentiality is not essential [10]. Moreover, these techniques do not consider the adaptability 
since they do not address encrypting scalable video contents. In contrast, the techniques reported 
in [11]-[13] ([12] will be used throughout this paper) attempt to implement comprehensive 
security while retaining the in-network adaptability. Naturally, these techniques encrypt the 
payloads of each NAL unit while keeping the header information plain so that any in-network 
adaptation node can treat them as if they are not encrypted. To maintain the independency of 
each encrypted NAL unit, a unique Initialization Vector (IV) is determined for each NAL unit. 
Going against this norm, the video encryption architecture discussed in [14] derives the IV from 
a previously encrypted NAL unit. In this way, a dependency is created between encrypted NAL 
units. The IV generation technique is designed in such a way that the encryption dependencies 
match with the encoding dependencies amongst the scalability layers. Hence, loss of any NAL 
unit makes all the dependent NAL units unencryptable. However, this does not pose any problem 
because all the dependent NAL units of any dropped NAL unit are also dropped in scalable video 
adaptation. 
The above encryption techniques are specific solutions for each coding technique. In contrast, 
Mukherjee et al. have developed a format independent technique for encrypting scalable video 
contents [15]. They propose making use of the MPEG-21 DIA Bit stream Syntax Description 
(BSD) tool to encrypt bit stream segments progressively. Such a encryption structure creates 
interdependencies amongst segments which negatively affects the error resilience of the video bit 
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streams. Thus, this technique is not suitable for video communication applications over lossy 
channels. 
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ADAPTATION OF SECURED CONTENT IN GOVERNED 
MULTIMEDIA APPLICATIONS 
Figure 1 presents the functional architecture of the proposed platform. It covers a complete 
DRM system while permitting the adaptation of secure content. It is based on the Multimedia 
Information Protection and Management System (MIPAMS) architecture [16]. MIPAMS was 
devised for the management of multimedia information taking into account DRM and protection. 
Specifically, the aim of this DRM architecture is to enable the management of multimedia 
content through the complete content value chain, from content creation to consumption by end 
users, including adaptation of digital content. A detailed comparison study of MIPAMS with 
other DRM architectures can be found in [17]. 
The Governance Server provides functionalities for the creation and storage of licenses, and 
online license based authorization; it is responsible for performing authorizations of users to 
perform actions over resources. When a user tries to perform an action over a resource, this 
module checks if a license has been issued to the user authorizing him to perform the requested 
operation. 
Furthermore, it integrates adaptation authorization functionalities that permit to govern 
complex content adaptation operations through the use of detailed descriptions of the permitted 
conversions expressed in MPEG-21 DIA. 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed architecture for the adaptation of secured content in governed multimedia applications 
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The Content Server enables users and applications to create, edit, upload, browse and search 
digital resources. Those resources can be protected. Then, the protection keys are requested to 
the Protection Service, which sends an encrypted version of the key to the Content Server, next 
those keys are resgistered through the Protection Server. 
The Protection Server offers a service for protecting digital contents, digital objects or 
metadata, mainly using encryption techniques and scrambling. The actual data to be protected, 
either audiovisual media content or metadata, is converted to unintelligible form by means of a 
scrambling transformation, using a secret key as an input parameter. The values of the 
scrambling keys are not stored directly in the Protection Server. Instead, an encrypted version of 
these keys is stored, using an appropriate protection key. The protection keys, and not the 
scrambling keys, are associated with the corresponding licenses. Both the scrambling of contents 
and the protection of the scrambling keys are achieved with cryptographic algorithms. The term 
“scrambling” is simply used to distinguish the encryption of contents from the encryption of 
keys, for analogy with the traditional use of this term for protected audiovisual media content 
transmissions. 
The Adaptation Engine (AE) is the primary content adaptation module in the proposed 
architecture. It comprises two main building blocks for performing its adaptation task, namely 
the adaptation decision taking block and the actual content adapting block. Adaptation decision 
block is responsible for taking into account all of the usage environment constraints as well as 
users preferences through the means of various context elements in an adaptation system, and 
subsequently for processing them and deciding on what kind of a content adaptation tool to be 
employed to best serve those constraints and preferences. The decision information is then 
passed to the actual content adapting block, whose task is to execute the necessary tools and 
operations, as dictated by the taken adaptation decisions. Certainly, both of these tasks are 
undertaken in line with the necessary authorizations provided by the Governance Server, which 
also acts as the Adaptation Authorizer (AA) for operation of the overall system. 
The proposed architecture is capable of supporting both “trusted” and “untrusted” types of 
AEs. As the name implies, a trusted AE is the one that can make use of the security keys 
provided to it for decrypting a secured content, so as to be able to perform a number of both 
structural and signal-level content adaptation operations on the audiovisual media streams. With 
a similar analogy, an untrusted AE is a content adapting engine, with which a security key cannot 
be shared, and thus the content adaptation operation should be performed on the media stream 
blindly (that is to say, without decrypting the content) [12]. 
The Supervision Server provides a number of functionalities, ranging from the authentication 
and supervision of actors and system components to the receipt and storage of the event reports, 
regarding content consumption or other relevant issues in the system. 
The Registration Server is an equally significant module in this architecture, which is 
responsible for supplying the necessary certificates to the various actors and components 
involved in the system in order to guarantee their authenticity and integrity. 
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The Intermediary module acts as the interface between the user (“Trusted client” in Figure 1) 
and the main modules of the platforms. Thus, the user registers, gets authenticated, and selects to 
access certain contents through this particular module. Furthermore, the Intermediary is 
responsible for detecting context updates, and consequently requesting the necessary adaptations, 
authorizations, etc for applying on the content. 
Finally, the Content Server stores not only the content, but also the associated metadata. 
IV. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE APPLICATION SCENARIO 
In our particular example scenario, illustrated in Figure 2, video surveillance is used as the 
primary means of a deterrent measure against unauthorized access to, for example, a car 
manufacturing plant. In addition to the video surveillance system operated by numerous 
strategically positioned cameras continuously monitoring both inside and outside of the plant, the 
surveillance relies on a team of security guards with mobile monitoring devices (i.e., dedicated 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs)), and a control room, in which the collected data is 
processed, compressed and stored in the highest possible resolution, bit/frame rate and quality 
for further use if needed. The guards are expected to have varying levels of access to different 
parts of the manufacturing plant, as the premises of the research and development and marketing 
strategy departments may be protected at a higher level than other parts of the site, which are 
housing the administrative offices, canteen areas, etc. In this way, while some senior guards can 
access video content from a number of positions, the junior guards are only able to receive 
content related to their permitted areas. 
This application scenario is particularly significant, as it involves the co-existence of both real-
time and stored compressed video content acquired through the surveillance cameras. The video 
feeds are of encrypted nature, so as to avoid intervention by unauthorized access to the captured 
content, which requires the protection of not only the content itself, but also the metadata 
through encryption. Authentication is important, as it ensures the integrity of content via means 
of protection, while also providing the necessary proof that an authentic source has generated the 
content. Relevant licenses are used while accessing the surveillance content, as they help to 
associate different qualities and levels of access to the same content among the users, as 
discussed above. Privacy features are needed, as different regions of the surveillance content can 
be protected in a different way to protect the privacy of captured particular subjects in a scene 
by, for instance, scrambling faces, etc. In this scenario, a two-level encryption scheme is 
considered. Each piece of content is encrypted using a random encryption key (e.g., key x1 in 
Figure 2), and in the same way, metadata is encrypted using another random key (e.g., key x2 in 
Figure 2). These random keys are in turn encrypted with whichever keys afford access to 
particular pieces of data (e.g., keys Ax, Bx, or C in Figure 2). For example, Ax could be used to 
encrypt x2 and Bx to encrypt x1 and x2. In this way, Ax would only be supplied to entities allowed 
to access the metadata, but not the content, such as untrusted AEs; and Bx would only be 
supplied to trusted AEs and authorized users. 
  8
 
Fig. 2.  Video Surveillance application scenario 
It is equally important that the surveillance video content can be adapted, as both mobile 
security team guards and members of the fixed control unit staff may wish to access the same 
content with varying terminal features and access network technologies as well as under diverse 
usage environment conditions, including their preferences towards different portions of the 
captured live or stored video information. All of these necessitate a set of tools for adapting 
secured surveillance content, such as transrating, cropping and focusing into an area of attention, 
summarization of stored video, etc, in such a complex and heterogeneous yet governed 
multimedia application scenario. 
The subsequent subsections will provide further descriptions of the two specific use cases 
identified within the aforementioned application scenario along with the associated requirements, 
and work and parameter exchange flows that are envisaged to prevail in these use cases in detail. 
A. Use case 1 – Guards moving around buildings and receiving the surveillance content on 
their PDAs 
The first use case in the Video Surveillance application scenario focuses on patrolling security 
guards on site (both inside and outside of the buildings). The guards are equipped with PDAs, 
dedicated to receive both on-line (i.e., live) and off-line (i.e., recorded) compressed surveillance 
content through the existing wireless access medium, such as a WiMAX network set-up on and 
  9
around the premises. The content is captured through numerous surveillance cameras deployed 
across the site, and data from these cameras is collected by the main processing unit in the 
control facility, which is then compressed and distributed to the PDAs of the requesting guards 
based on their location. 
In this use case, the authenticated surveillance content is secured through encryption with a 
random key (e.g., key y1) and similarly, the related metadata is encrypted with another random 
key (e.g., key y2), which are used to encrypt every piece of data; and the associated licenses 
restrict access to the secured content and the related metadata depending on the location of the 
guards as well as their authorized access levels. The guards are expected to possess varying 
levels of access to different parts of the manufacturing plant; and this can be arranged using their 
staff membership identifiers. Therefore, there is a need for a number of encryption keys (i.e., key 
Ay, key By), and associating identifiers, which are related to the staff access levels. These keys 
are used to encrypt the content and metadata encryption keys (e.g., key y1 and y2, respectively). 
The different encrypted versions of the random encryption keys are stored in the Protection 
Server; every time a guard moves from one area to another, he/she needs to be re-authorized to 
view any content, and if so, the Governance Server supplies him/her with the necessary key(s), 
previously acquired from the Protection Server (e.g., key Ay, By).  
All of the keys referred above can be used with a fast and secure symmetric encryption 
algorithm like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Current software implementations of this 
algorithm can cope with real-time encryption of video data at the bit rates that are usual for 
mobile devices. Depending on the security requirements different key lengths can be used, e.g., 
128-bit for bulk-encryption keys (y1, y2) and 192-bit for key-encryption keys (Ay, By). 
As the usage environment of the surveillance content primarily involves access through a 
mobile and wireless network by the end-terminals with restricted capabilities and display sizes 
(i.e., PDAs in this particular use case), it is necessary to provide low resolution and low bit/frame 
rate version of the original rich video (with the highest possible resolution, bit/frame rate and 
quality) to serve for the prevailing limited network bandwidth and device display size 
constraints. This is achievable through employing adaptation capabilities of the proposed 
architecture on the scalable video captured by the surveillance system. Furthermore, a minimum 
limit for the content resolution is guaranteed through the use of licenses for the guards to receive 
the necessary quality of the video to be able to detect any incident. In this way, a preview quality 
video can be fed to the mobile guards unless further and more specific adaptation operations are 
authorized for a particular guard and his/her terminal.  
Typically, the operation of the architecture in this particular use case can be as follows: a 
mobile security guard logs into the surveillance system through his/her PDA (i.e., accessing via 
the Supervision Server) and tries to access the content being recorded in a certain surveillance 
area. The Intermediary detects that the captured and recorded video content occupies too much 
space due to its very large size, and realizing that the user requests it through his/her mobile 
terminal over a resource-limited wireless access network, it directly contacts the AE with a 
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request for downscaling the large size of the requested video for a suitable viewing condition. 
While doing this, it is expected to supply the AE with the relevant context (not encrypted) of the 
usage environment, such as the terminal display size, network conditions, security IDs, etc 
(MPEG-21 DIA Usage Environment Description (UED) descriptors).  
At this stage, an authorization for such adaptation also needs to be obtained. The Governance 
Server supplies the AE with the necessary information on the permitted adaptations. If the AE is 
an untrusted one, it performs adaptation of the content without the need for decrypting it (the 
Governance Server will allow the adaptation, but will only attach the metadata decryption key 
(e.g., key Ay) within the Adaptation Authorization Response). Otherwise (i.e., trusted), the key 
associated to content and metadata (e.g., key By) will be supplied by the Governance Server, as 
usual through the Supervision Server. During these operations, if the guard, who has requested 
the surveillance content, moves to an “untrusted” area, the context update associated to the new 
environment is supplied to the Governance Server, which then contacts the Content Server to 
interrupt the streaming of the secured surveillance video. 
If the guard tries to continue accessing the protected content from the untrusted area or even 
from outside the system, the access will be prevented by a number of measures. First, access is 
only permitted through a trusted client, which will not make the decryption keys available to 
external applications, i.e., it will not be possible to extract and keep a local copy of the keys. 
Also, the authorization-based license enforcing mechanism provided by the Governance Server 
will not allow access to the protected content if the license conditions are not met. Finally, the 
security policy of the system may determine how often the encryption keys are changed, e.g., 
everyday or even every few minutes, in order to further hamper unauthorized access in case the 
trusted client was somehow bypassed. 
The relevant parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for this 
use case are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3.  Parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for use case 1 
B. Use case 2 – Police investigation requires access to the recorded content and zoom into 
areas of attention in a scene in order to recognize faces 
In the second use case, the original content, which was captured and stored in the highest 
possible resolution, bit/frame rate and quality, is accessed by the top level authorized users (e.g., 
the head of the security team on site, the police, etc) later, so as to investigate a potential security 
breach that has been reported following an incident. Thus, the highest resolution content is 
encrypted with different random keys (e.g., key x1a, x1b, etc) for each part of the content, which 
has a different access level. All of these content encryption keys are encrypted with the master 
key (i.e., key C). In order to restrict access to specific parts of the secured content, keys x1a, x1b, 
etc are also encrypted with other encryption keys, such as keys Bxa (for x1a), Bxb (for x1a and x1b), 
etc. Then, depending on his/her role and location, the appropriate decryption key (key Bxa, key 
Bxb, key C, etc) will be delivered to the user. Moreover, associated content-related metadata 
information is encrypted using a random key (e.g., key x2), which is in turn encrypted with keys 
Ai and Bi (where i stands for xa, xb, etc). Metadata is also stored and encrypted (as detailed in use 
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case 1), and contains information related to time stamps, location, camera angle identification, 
etc of the captured video feed along with the necessary licenses for accessing the content. 
As in use case 1, the keys mentioned above will belong to a symmetric encryption algorithm 
like AES. In this case, more sensible data can be encrypted with stronger keys, e.g., a 192-bit key 
can be used for high resolution content, and a 256-bit key can be used as the master key (key C). 
As discussed before, licenses are required for associating different qualities and levels of 
access to the content, and hence also related to the metadata. Furthermore, the relevant metadata 
assists the authentication tasks to ensure the integrity of the content is preserved, while also 
providing a proof that an authentic source has generated the content. Event reporting information 
is also stored in a repository, and the Supervision Server provides functionalities to users for 
consulting the summaries of the reports, etc. 
If a brief operational workflow is drawn as per the description provided in the previous use 
case, it can be exemplified as follows: upon receiving an alert, a police officer logs into the 
surveillance system (via the Supervision Server) through a Personal Computer (PC) located in 
the control room and selects to view a specific portion of the content recorded by one of the 
surveillance cameras. The Governance Server checks if the user has the appropriate permissions 
to view the requested video content, and as he/she is a member of the police, the video is 
rendered. For this purpose, the Governance Server supplies the decryption key to the 
Intermediary by requesting it from the Protection Server following the positive authorization of 
the user. The user’s terminal is either the PC monitor or a TV screen with high resolution 
capabilities, as opposed to the PDA terminals used by the mobile security guards, as per in the 
first use case. The request from the police user includes not only the video content, but also the 
summary of the Event Reports related to the video and the metadata (e.g., time, place, recording 
camera, etc). The police officer selects a specific region of a scene and tries to zoom into, and 
thus focus on a suspicious looking person or persons in this scene in order to recognize the 
face(s). This request indicates the need for an adaptation operation on the stored high resolution 
surveillance content. Thus, the Governance Server checks whether the user can perform this 
adaptation and given that he/she has the appropriate permissions, the image is adapted and 
rendered. For performing this operation, the Governance Server needs to supply the decryption 
key to the AE, as the particular adaptation request requires further accessing into the low-level 
and possibly semantic and structural specifics of the compressed video content. The associated 
parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for this use case are 
depicted in Figure 4. 
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Fig. 4.  Parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for use case 2 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Governance Server, not only copes with the “traditional” authorization, which accepts or 
denies a particular user the access to a particular content, but also deals with the governance of 
various types of adaptations by means of fine-grained descriptions (expressed in MPEG-21 DIA) 
integrated in MPEG-21 licenses. 
In use case 1, for example, when a junior guard located in a “trusted” area would try to access 
the surveillance content, an automatic adaptation request would be sent from the Intermediary to 
the AE. The subsequent authorization request message sent by the AE to the Governance Server 
is shown in Figure 5. The message specifies the membershipID, the resourceID, the right 
requested by the user, and his/her location; and as can be seen from this figure, it is expressed 
based on the MPEG-21 REL and MPEG-7 descriptors to guarantee interoperability. 
The same authorization request could also be used for use case 2. The only differences in this 
case would be that the Principal would be a police officer (and thus, the user identifier would be 
different from that of Figure 5), the resource would be pieces of recorded content from several 
rooms (e.g., “urn:videosurveillance”) or a specific region of interest of the recorded content of a 
particular room (e.g., “urn:videosurveillance:D6:room008:ROI10”), and the location would be 
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the Security Control Room instead of the one mentioned in Figure 5, which would be a “highly 
secure” zone. 
 
<authorizationrequest> 
 <r:keyHolder> 
  <!-- Principal --> 
  <r:info> 
   <sx:commonName>1234567X</sx:commonName>  
   <!-- Junior Guard membership identifier--> 
  </r:info> 
 </r:keyHolder> 
 <mx:play/> 
 <mx:diReference> 
  <mx:identifier>urn:videosurveillance:D6:room008</mx:identifier>   
  <!--Resource--> 
 </mx:diReference>  
 <mpeg7:Place> 
  <mpeg7:StructuredInternalCoordinates> 
   <RoomNumber>008</RoomNumber> 
   <RoomName>Sala becaris I</RoomName> 
   <BuildingName>D6</BuildingName> 
  </mpeg7:StructuredInternalCoordinates>  <!--"Highly Secure" location-->  
 </mpeg7:Place> 
</authorizationrequest> 
 
Fig. 5.  Authorization request example 
The Governance Server would, then, check the repository of licenses in order to identify the 
licenses associated to the required resource and principal, and subsequently would or would not 
authorize the request by comparing the information of the authorization request message with the 
conditions specified in the license. As can be seen in Figure 6, the authorization response 
message includes an authorization response element, which is a Boolean, a list of the permitted 
adaptations and their corresponding constraints specified in the license, and the necessary key to 
decrypt the content and/or metadata encryption keys. 
  
  15
<authorizationresponse> 
 <authorization>true</authorization> 
 <dia:permittedDiaChanges> 
  <!--Adaptation of the Spatial Resolution--> 
  <dia:ConversionDescription xsi:type="dia:ConversionUriType"> 
   <dia:ConversionActUri uri="urn:visnet:SpatialResolutionScaling"/> 
  </dia:ConversionDescription> 
 </dia:permittedDiaChanges> 
 <dia:changeConstraint> 
  <dia:constraint> 
   <dia:AdaptationUnitConstraints> 
    <!--minimum limits for spatial resolution(width<100)--> 
    <dia:LimitConstraint> 
     <dia:Argument xsi:type="dia:SemanticalRefType" semantics= 
"urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-DIA-MediaInformationCS-NS:17"/>  
     <!--17 refers to the frame width--> 
     <dia:Argument xsi:type="dia:ConstantDataType"> 
      <dia:Constant xsi:type="dia:IntegerType"> 
       <dia:Value>100</dia:Value> 
      </dia:Constant> 
     </dia:Argument> 
     <dia:Operation operator="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-DIA-
StackFunctionOperatorCS-NS:13"/> 
     <!--13 refers to the operator “>”--> 
    </dia:LimitConstraint> 
    <!--height must be more than 50--> 
    <dia:LimitConstraint> 
     <dia:Argument xsi:type="dia:SemanticalRefType" semantics= 
"urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-DIA-MediaInformationCS-NS:18"/>  
     <!--18 refers to the frame height--> 
     <dia:Argument xsi:type="dia:ConstantDataType"> 
      <dia:Constant xsi:type="dia:IntegerType"> 
       <dia:Value>50</dia:Value> 
      </dia:Constant> 
     </dia:Argument> 
     <dia:Operation operator="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-DIA-
StackFunctionOperatorCS-NS:13"/> 
     <!--13 refers to the operator “>”--> 
    </dia:LimitConstraint> 
   </dia:AdaptationUnitConstraints> 
  </dia:constraint> 
 </dia:changeConstraint> 
 <xenc:EncryptedKey> 
  <xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
  <xenc:CipherData> 
   <xenc:CipherValue>LV4A5x5YdnCqikkFBLE9fruA....</xenc:CipherValue> 
  </xenc:CipherData> 
  <xenc:CarriedKeyName>Content Encryption Key 
Name</xenc:CarriedKeyName> 
 </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
</authorizationresponse> 
 
Fig. 6.  Authorization response example 
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It is also a remarkable fact that to date, the MPEG-21 REL “Location” element has merely 
allowed expressing a postal address; and hence, we believe that for the Video Surveillance 
application scenario, it is essential that the conditions included in the licenses should be able to 
express more meaningful and accurate locations, such as Global Positioning System (GPS) 
coordinates or any other internally structured coordinates. Thus, we propose to extend the 
MPEG-21 REL location element with the MPEG-7 “Place” element. We envisage that this 
extension should be a part of a new MPEG-21 REL profile for Video Surveillance applications. 
Regarding the user-access authorization (Figure 4), the exchange of messages would be the 
same. The Intermediary would be responsible for guaranteeing that the user access is performed 
respecting the adaptation constraints (which should be fulfilled whether the content is adapted or 
not), and if necessary, for requesting the required adaptation operation from the AE. 
In use case 1, the video content sent from the Content Server is downscaled by the AE. Since 
the video content has been encoded in a scalable format, this adaptation can be carried out by 
simply dropping parts of the content. Moreover, the video content is encrypted using the 
technology presented in [12], which allows adapting the encrypted contents without decrypting 
them. As a result, it is possible to use an untrusted AE to perform this adaptation. In this case, the 
AE only needs the access to the metadata for deciding the appropriate adaptation that satisfies 
the usage environment constraints such as terminal capabilities and network conditions. The 
input to the adaptation process is an encrypted stream. The AE selects which fragments of this 
stream are to be sent to the guard’s terminal. The output is another stream, which is also 
encrypted, as no decryption is performed, and of a suitable size for the terminal to comfortably 
display (after being decrypted with the appropriate key). Table I summarizes the example usage 
environment constraints and related adaptation results. Visual comparison between the original 
and adapted sequences is shown in Figure 7. Please note that the Pedestrian high definition test 
video sequence has been used for demonstration purposes. 
Table I. Example usage environment constraints and adaptation results for use case 1 
                                                 Constraints 
Terminal display resolution VGA (640×480) @ 15 fps 
Channel bandwidth 512 kbps 
                                               Original content 
Spatial resolutions 480×256, 960×512, and 1920×1024 pixels 
Temporal resolutions 6.25, 12.5, and 25 fps 
Quality levels per spatial resolution 2 (Low and High) 
Bit rate 5 Mbps 
                                               Adapted content 
Spatial resolutions 480×256 pixels 
Temporal resolutions 6.25 and 12.5 fps 
Quality of the highest resolution layer Low  
Bit rate 280 kbps 
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                               (a)                                                                                  (b) 
Fig. 7.  The decoded bit streams (scaled to 13% of the original resolution): (a) adapted by dropping the highest 
spatial scalability layers and (b) original 
In use case 2, content is adapted upon request by a security officer in order to zoom into a 
specific region of a video, in this case to view with the highest possible detail of a person’s face. 
In this scenario, we can consider that one type of adaptation is already being performed, namely 
the downscaling of the video to match the display resolution. After requesting to zoom into the 
region of interest, downscaling is no longer appropriate, which implies that the higher quality 
layers must be decrypted by means of the appropriate key. Instead, a new adaptation is applied: 
the cropping of the Region Of Interest (ROI). As with the previous use case, if this adaptation 
can be performed by dropping parts of the video stream, it is still possible to use an untrusted 
AE. In this case, the encoding of the original video content should be performed compatible to 
the needs of this type of adaptation (such as enabling the interactive ROI feature in the encoding 
stage). Furthermore, the pertinent metadata should be available to the untrusted AE. 
Nevertheless, the adaptation is performed by a trusted AE in our experiments, as the original 
video stream does not support the aforementioned feature. Therefore, the keys for decoding both 
the metadata as well as video data are received by the AE. As in the previous case, the AE uses 
the usage environment constraints to determine the properties of the adapted video such as the 
cropping window definition, output resolution and bit rate. Subsequently, the content is 
transcoded accordingly. Table II summarizes the example usage environment constraints and 
corresponding adaptation results.  
Assuming that the encircled person standing in front of the shop is the ROI, Figure 8 (a) shows 
a snapshot of the adapted content. Moreover, Figure 8 (b) shows a snapshot of the video stream 
adapted using an alternative adaptation approach, which is the adaptation performed in use case 
1. 
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Table II. Example usage environment constraints and adaptation results for use case 2 
                                                 Constraints 
Terminal display resolution XVGA (1024×768) @ 60 fps 
Channel bandwidth 1 Mbps 
                                               Original content 
Spatial resolutions 480×256, 960×512, and 1920×1024 pixels 
Temporal resolutions 6.25, 12.5, and 25 fps 
Quality levels per spatial resolution 2 (Low and High) 
Bit rate 5 Mbps 
                                               Adapted content 
Spatial resolution 960×512 pixels 
Temporal resolution 25 fps 
Quality of the highest resolution layer Standard (The adapted sequence is a non-
scalable video stream) 
Bit rate 970 kbps 
 
 
 
     
                               (a)                                                                                                    (b) 
Fig. 8.  The decoded bit streams (scaled to 26% of the original resolution): (a) adapted by cropping the ROI and 
(b) adapted by dropping the highest spatial scalability layers 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has presented a proposed architecture for the secure adaptation and distribution of 
digital contents in governed multimedia applications. This is a modular architecture, which 
enables the adaptation of any kind of secured content to enhance users’ perceived quality in 
heterogeneous usage environments. The proposed functional architecture can be used to manage 
protected contents in a wide variety of applications, ranging from collaborative scenarios to 
security applications; from infotainment and e-services to numerous prosumer applications. This 
paper has focused on Video Surveillance applications, because they are present in our everyday 
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lives, and they pose a challenge for addressing privacy protection and the secure management of 
digital content in heterogeneous usage environments. Due to the diverse nature of the scenario 
under consideration, two different use cases have been presented.  
Further work in this area may consider a variation of the second use case, where most of the 
video is encrypted with one key, yet some sensitive parts are encrypted with a different and more 
restrictive key, for which a special license is required. For example, in order to protect users’ 
privacy, the faces of persons appearing in the video can be scrambled with a higher level key, 
while the rest of the scene is scrambled with a lower level key. Consequently, the guards would 
then have access to the latter part of the overall video, and would be able to view the protected 
content except for the faces in the image. The authorized police officers only would be able to 
use the higher level key to zoom into a specific ROI and view this particular region in detail. 
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